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ABSTRACT 
 
 Network security has always had an issue with secure authentication and 
identification. In the current mixed device network of today, the number of nodes on a 
network has expanded but these nodes are often unmanaged from a network security 
perspective.  The solution proposed requires a paradigm shift, a recognition of what has 
already happened, identity is for sale across the internet.  That identity is the users’ network 
ID, their behavior, and even their behavior in using the networks.  Secondly a majority of the 
devices on the Internet have been fingerprinted.  Use of device fingerprinting can help secure 
a network if properly understood and properly executed.  The research into this area suggests 
a solution.  Which is the use of device fingerprints including clock skews to identify the 
devices and a dual- authentication process targeted at authenticating the device and the user.  
Not only authenticating the identity presented but also combining them into a unified entity 
so failure to authenticate part of the entity means the whole is denied access to the network 
and its resources. 
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CHAPTER I 
 INTRODUCTION  
 
Information networks are not a new creation.  They have existed in a variety of forms 
using signals to communicate information to their current form, computer networks. Security 
of information networks has been a major concern for as long as men have built information 
networks.  This security has been addressed in a variety of ways through encryption, user 
identification, the use of wax stamps to identify the sender, all the way to the present with 
complex multi-factor authentication systems.  Most network access solutions work via the 
authentication of the user with the assumption the machine the user is employing is a valid 
device and ignoring the machines on the network that are considered unmanageable.  These 
unmanageable machines often do not require a user to login but still pass traffic and data 
across the pipes [69].  This paper will explore the proposition, device finger printing can be 
used as part of a multi-factor identification/authentication scheme that adds security to a 
network.  More than just using device fingerprinting as part of the authentication process, I 
advance a rather novel concept, the use of the device fingerprint as an on ramp to cyberspace. 
To those two ends this paper will cover its material in the following fashion, an introduction 
to define the problem, a section where the definition of a key concept, identification and 
authentication; in information assurance is discussed and refined.  Next, having refined the 
definitions I will look at the current state of device finger printing across the Internet.  The 
next section of the paper, will review the authentication process and look at the Extensible 
Authentication Protocol paying attention to the version with Transport Layer Security, EAP-
TLS.  The following section, Chapter Four, will propose a different solution incorporating 
2 
 
device fingerprinting, EAP-TLS, and also propose a paradigm shift regarding computers and 
networks.  In this section the question of is it technically possible will be answered using 
research from the previous two sections.  Also, the question will be answered, what changes 
will be required to make the paradigm shift.  Finally, the question of is it legally possible will 
be touched on. Any change in user behavior and this would require a change must first 
satisfy the simple binary algorithm 𝐴𝐴 = (𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖) where A is action for change, C is the user, 
m is motivation, p is perception, and i is the information. If any of these three factors is 0 
then no action for change will occur.  It is in this last chapter I hope to satisfy all the above 
requirements.  The research as to whether this is possible has been accomplished and 
reviewed in the previous two sections so the appendix will contain a link to the various data 
sets used in the research allowing the reader the opportunity to check data supporting the 
proposal.   
 
1.1 Composition of contemporary networks 
A contemporary network may be of mono or poly device composition.  In a mono-device 
network much like many home networks, you have a variety of Wi-Fi devices all connected 
using the common router or a set of routers with extenders to cover a limited physical area 
and provide an on-ramp to the world-wide web and its resources.  In a more corporate 
environment the type of devices will shift from a mono-device network to a more mixed 
environment referred here as a poly device network.  These networks will be a mix of Wi-Fi 
devices and wired devices.  In group of Wi-Fi devices, there may also be variety of devices, 
ranging from a desktop PC with a wireless card in it to mobile devices such as a cellphone or 
a tablet.  Even among the wired devices there can be a variety of different operating systems 
3 
 
(OS), browsers, model numbers, and vendors.  As the movement to Bring Your Own Device 
(BYOD) gains ground the flavor and variety of devices in such a network will make the poly 
device network environment even more complex.  In both environments security and the 
presence of unauthorized devices becomes an issue. 
In the mono device environment, use of resources can be consumed and network 
throughput for legitimate users are reduced with unauthorized use of Access Points (AP) 
[46].     In a poly device environment, the number of attack vectors, assuming each device 
provides a vector, multiplies greatly.  Often in such complex environments, the issue of what 
devices are legitimately on the network becomes an issue [47].  Many approaches to the 
identifying legitimate devices have been applied and are currently being marketed.  In part, 
this is due to the weakness in the current identification and authentication schema, username 
and password, practiced by many networks.  Though many of the schemas advanced to 
enhance network access control (NAC) work very well they do not go far enough to ensure 
that unauthorized or unidentified devices are on the network.  In some cases, the NAC has a 
class of devices it is unable to identify or manage.   To this end, I want to advance the use of 
device fingerprinting as a certificate not only for identification purposes in the authentication 
process but as part of an ongoing process to ensure only proper authenticated devices are part 
of the network.  The Internet is exploding with the addition of sensors, home appliances, and 
multiple devices for users ranging from traditional workstations/laptops to personal health 
devices with their associated controllers/reporters.  Each of these items bring their own set of 
risks, attack vectors, and information data sets.  In the connected world of the internet, the 
data produced, used, and processed by the extensive collection of devices is at risk of hijack, 
ransom at best and at worse manipulation skewing results in favor of parties with vested 
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interest in the results.  In this environment, it becomes critical to ensure the devices 
connected to a network have a legitimate reason for being attached.  Device fingerprinting 
offers not only the ability to identify specific devices but used as part of the authentication 
process can ensure only devices with a legitimate purpose are attached to a network.  
However, there are many issues that cloud or confuse the discussion of the authentication.  
 
1.2 Current view of identification and authentication an issue 
One of the main issues with the discussion of authentication is the use of the terms 
identification and authentication interchangeably [90].  This substituting use creates a 
problem as the concepts while complementary are not inter-changeable.  The authentication 
is a process in which identification is a sub-process.  IEEE Standard fort Local and 
metropolitan area networks - Port-Based Network Access Control, IEEE 802.1X-2010 
provides guidance for “providing compatible authentication, authorization, and cryptographic 
key agreement mechanisms to support secure communication between devices connected by 
IEEE 802® Local Area Networks (LANs), this standard: 
a) Specifies a general method for provision of port-based network access control. 
b) Specifies protocols that establish secure associations for IEEE Std 802.1AE™ 
MAC Security. 
c) Facilitates the use of industry standard authentication and authorization 
protocols.”  [42] 
For clarity, we can turn to the IEEE Online Dictionary which states in this document, 802.1, 
authentication is “The process of verifying an identity claimed by or for a system entity. 
Defined in RFC 4949” [IEEE Standards Online Dictionary, accessed 6 Oct 2016]. In the 
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same RFC 4949, identification is “an act or process that presents an identifier to a system so 
that the system can recognize a system entity and distinguish it from other entities.”   As you 
can see from the definitions provided, identification and authentication are not 
interchangeable rather identification is a sub process within the authentication process.   
Figure 1 below provides a simplified diagram of the process. 
Start
Identification
Present 
Identification
Authentication
(validate 
Identification 
presented)
Authorization
Authorize
(validate 
presented ID 
has rights to 
use)
End
Yes that is an ID
Not a 
system 
value ID
The presented ID does not 
have authorization
Is this a valid 
ID? Yes
Yes Yes
No
No
No
 
Figure 1 - Authentication Process 
 
An analogy would be the presentation of a driver’s license for identification and the official 
taking your license (token) and validating it through a series of tests, visual inspection, 
followed up by calling in via radio or onboard computer, to see if the identification provided 
matches what is stored in the state’s databases.  In the most common schema of identification 
and authentication, the username often functions as the identity being provided to the system.  
The password is the verification or authentication that the identity being provided is who they 
claim to be.   
Authorization is another word used as a substitute for the process of authentication 
[90].  However, this too is an incorrect usage of terminology.  In RFC 4949, authorization is 
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defined as “either an approval that is granted to a system entity to access system resources or 
a process for granting approval to a system entity to access a system resource.”  In calling 
attention to the phrase “access a system resource,” I am pointing out that this differs from 
verifying the identity of a system entity and so to use authorization as synonymous with 
authentication or identification would be incorrect.  An incorrect terminology will often lead 
to incorrect problem definition and may even mask the true problems in a process.  By 
providing this clarification of terminology upfront, I hope to become a little more precise in a 
probable solution while at the same time provide a perceptual lens to look at the research in 
this area.   Having clarified the definition of the three key terms, identification, 
authentication, and authorization we can now move on to the last of our four key concepts 
and definitions, device fingerprinting.  Unfortunately, there is no definitive definition in 
IEEE or RFC for device fingerprinting though RFC 6973 on “Privacy Considerations for 
Internet Protocols” provides this definition of a fingerprint, “a set of information elements 
that identifies a device or application instance.”  Yet the linking of device and fingerprint 
remained for “Opinion 9/2014 on the application of Directive 2002/58/EC to device 
fingerprinting” the EU’s Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, which defines device 
fingerprinting as “meaning that it includes a set of information that can be used to single out, 
link, or infer a user, user agent or device over time [93].”  Note the opinion which rules, 
“When a fingerprint is generated through the storage of or access to information stored in the 
user’s terminal device, the ePrivacy Directive applies [93],” does contain two exceptions.  
Later in this thesis, I want to return to the exceptions explaining how what I propose does not 
violate the ruling. We want to focus upon how device fingerprinting is accomplished.   
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1.3 The problem of authentication in a dynamic environment 
In the current networking environment, there are many technical issues.  Among the 
many issues facing network managers is the unauthorized device, or the intrusive device 
within the network structure.  Such devices not only provide attack vectors but also consume 
network resources, creating traffic, introducing latency, and because they are often not 
managed by a user become a gaping security hole when their OS is outdated, or their 
software has not been patched to cover known security issues.  The second issue a network 
manager faces in today’s poly device network is the authentication of users to the network 
along with an expectation from the user the corporate network will function much like their 
home network, with a single sign on (SSO) for all network resources including external 
connections to additional resources not resident on the corporate network.  Many computers 
and devices still use the username and password combination even though it has been shown 
to be one of the least effective ways of securing a network.  Primarily because both the 
username and password are subject to so many different kinds of attacks, from shoulder 
surfing to brute force attacks.  Identity theft is not only a risk in terms of personal identity but 
in the digital world such theft can expose the user to the unpleasant experience of data loss, 
financial loss, and personal identity loss.  Much effort has been expended in creating a 
variety of solutions to the authentication process including differing two factor 
authentication, three factor authentication, and four factor authentication. 
In two factor authentication, most schemes rely upon self-identification of who you are 
and often something you know or something you have.  In three factor authentication, the 
scheme may rely upon who you are, something you know, and something you have either a 
biometric pattern i.e. finger print or a card.  Recently, fourth factor authentication schemes 
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have emerged in an attempt to provide an additional vector of assurance that the self-
identified user is who they claim to be.  The fourth factor has been identified in several 
solutions and implementations as location, where you are [1], [17], [77] and [78].  In other 
implementations, it might be an addition of what you have or what you are. 
While each of these schemata have something to offer, they do fall short in terms of full 
authentication.  I want to provide a fuller definition of authentication.  As we have seen 
above the definition for authentication is straight forward and well defined, “The process of 
verifying an identity claimed by or for a system entity.” I want to further expand that 
definition by changing the last part of the phrase. Authentication becomes, the process of 
verifying an identity presented and the device it was used to present. This paper will attempt 
to suggest a methodology of accomplishing both goals simultaneously. 
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CHAPTER 2 
DEVICE FINGERPRINTING RESEARCH 
In a survey of the research literature of device fingerprinting, you can break subject matter 
down into a taxonomy of four broad categories.  The first category is: can we use hardware 
characteristics to identify a device?  The second category is: can we use hardware and 
software characteristics to identify a device?  The third category is: can we use user behavior 
to identify a particular device?  The last category is: can we use the software characteristics 
to identify a specific device?  Further each of these contains the same three subcategories of 
techniques noted in Kohno’s paper: “passive, active, and semi-passive.” The key questions 
all researchers attempt to answer is will the methodology be sufficiently unique to identify 
the device and if used is it sufficiently reliable to ensure that using the stratagem will not 
yield significant false positives.  In some cases to answer the question the researchers will 
propose a different methodology for isolating the signature of a device quickly. 
       
2.1  Hardware used to identify a device 
 In 2005, Tadayoshi Kohno, Andre Broido, and K.C. Claffy published a seminal1 
paper in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, titled, “Remote physical 
device fingerprinting.”  In this paper, instead of seeking to eliminate clock skews, Kohno et 
al, describes a way to not only exploit the clock skew but to capitalize on it so that a device 
can be remotely identified.  “Clock skews are the inherent tiny drifts in the clocks of 
hardware devices due to variations in the manufacturing process [8].”  To further define this 
concept, let Sx represent the device’s clock and Sx(t) as the time reported by Sx as the true 
                                                 
1 In “A passive approach to wireless device fingerprinting,” Gao refers to Kohno’s work as seminal. 
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time t.  This is true where 𝑆𝑆𝑥𝑥′ ≡ 𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆𝑥𝑥(𝑡𝑡)/𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 and 𝑆𝑆𝑥𝑥" (𝑡𝑡) ≡ 𝑑𝑑2𝑆𝑆𝑥𝑥(𝑡𝑡)/𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡2.  Let 𝑆𝑆𝑦𝑦 be the sender 
and 𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟 be the receiver.  Therefore, we can use the terminology as follows: 
1. Offset:  The difference reported between the time of 𝑆𝑆𝑦𝑦 and 𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟, or 𝑆𝑆𝑦𝑦(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟(𝑡𝑡). 
2. Frequency:  The rate of clock progression, frequency of time t of 𝑆𝑆𝑦𝑦 is reported as 
𝑆𝑆𝑦𝑦
′ (𝑡𝑡).  True time is stated as 1. 
3. Skew:  A skew is the difference between the clock of the sender and the clock of the 
observer (receiver).  So, the skew is relative to the clock of the receiver and is stated 
as 𝑆𝑆𝑦𝑦′ (𝑡𝑡) − 𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟′(𝑡𝑡). 
One final item needs to be defined in clock skew identification, this is drift.  Drift is the 
relative change or shift in a clock skew due to a series of environmental events.  This means 
both the sender’s and receiver’s clock will drift.  In using the clock skew for fingerprinting, 
the drift must be considered.  So, drift is stated as 𝑆𝑆𝑦𝑦′ (𝑡𝑡) −  𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟′(𝑡𝑡).  Work has been done to 
document the relative stability of the drift.  Such work has centered on the temperature of the 
processor and therefore the crystal which is used in the clock. 
 The clock skew methodology is based upon the following, observations are collected 
on the timestamp or the clock of the sender.  These observations are used to calculate the 
skew between the sender and the receiver using one of several algorithms, linear 
programming, linear regression, quick piecewise minimum, or as one paper used “a 
nonparametric Bayesian method to detect the number of devices and further classify the 
devices.” DF to enhance [62]. 
One of the major claims in Kohno’s work is, “the notion of remote physical device 
fingerprinting, or remotely fingerprinting a physical device, as opposed to an operating 
system or class of devices, without the fingerprinted device’s known cooperation [52].”   
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This has all sorts of implications when we discuss later in the paper probable application of 
device fingerprinting.  In the experiments, they tested it against NATs and discovered it 
worked “even if those hosts use random or constant IP IDs to counter Bellovin’s attack, even 
if all the hosts run the same operating system, and even if not all of the hosts are up at the 
same time [52].” There are some issues with using the clock skew as suggested by Kohno, in 
particular the research used the ICMP and TCP packet timestamps.  Some of the drawbacks 
are noted in Kohno, including some operating systems did not use the timestamp 
consistently.  Another drawback noted by a later contributor to the field [68] is the blocking 
of the ICMP and TCP packets with timestamps with the firewall or the use of NATs which if 
they do not block the timestamps altogether change the ICMP/TCP timestamp to the same 
value. (MS site on NAT).  While Kohno’s work was primarily on the wired side, the wireless 
side using clock skews was covered by several researchers [8], [34], [46], [54], [68], [74], 
and [82].    
 Kohno covered clock skews using the TCP timestamp which per RFC 1323 is a 
virtual clock that is derived from the system clock.  Jana and Kasera covered the use of clock 
skews for devices on a wireless network in their paper, “On Fast and Accurate Detection of 
Unauthorized Wireless Access Points Using Clock Skews,” published in 2010.  However, 
unlike Kohno et al which uses the clock from the timestamp Jana and Kasera “use the Time 
Synchronization Function (TSF) time stamps in the IEEE 802.11 beacon/probe response  
messages sent by the AP, to determine its clock skew [46].”  According to their research this 
has three advantages.  First, beacons are at a fast rate and all the time as well as independent 
of an application.”  Second, in RFC 1323, the default difference in clock speed is set in a 
range of 1 ms to 1 second per tick while the granularity of 802.11 TSF timer is 1 
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microsecond.  This is higher than that of the TCP time stamp clock.  “Third, as the beacon 
time stamp is the actual time when an AP sends a frame (i.e., the time after the channel is 
sensed to be free) rather than the time when it is scheduled to send the frame, we do not need 
to consider any significant unpredictable delays incurred by the network as in the case of 
TCP time stamps [46].”  A third method using hardware does not rely only clock skews but 
takes advantage of the heterogeneity of devices.  As explained in, “A Passive Technique for 
Fingerprinting Wireless Devices with Wired-side Observations,” authored by A. Selcuk 
Uluagac, Sakthi V. Radhakrishnan, Cherita Corbett, Antony Baca, and Raheem Beyah in 
2013, heterogeneity of devices uses the uniqueness in device configurations (e.g., processor, 
DMA controller, memory) and the device’s clock skew.  This method works well for devices 
attached to the network that traditionally resist identification or management as all devices 
attached have some form of the of the trio: processor, DMA controller, and memory.  In this 
method there are four major stages: feature extraction, signature generation, similarity 
measure, and enrollment.  In the first stage, traffic is collected and a feature extraction 
process is run.  The feature extraction uses the packet inter-arrival-time (IAT).  “IAT 
measures the delay (∆t) between successive packets and characterizes the traffic rate. The 
IAT feature vector is defined as: 
𝑓𝑓 = (∆ 𝑡𝑡1,∆ 𝑡𝑡2,∆ 𝑡𝑡3, … ,∆𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖) 
Where ∆𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 is the inter-arrival time between packet 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑖𝑖 − 1 [82].”  The second stage is 
signature generation.  In this stage, statistical analysis is to reveal patterns in the 
measurements.  Uluagac et al used a time-domain model measuring the distribution of the 
IAT feature.  The distributions capture the frequency event of stage one and tosses them into 
time defined bins, 𝐵𝐵𝑛𝑛.  These bins are equally spaced across the time defined space.  “The 
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device signature is sensitive to the bin width and different bin widths will reveal different 
information about the feature vector [82].”  If the bin widths are too small, then fewer IAT 
values will occur within the specific bin.  This causes true features to be falsely identified as 
random noise within the traffic.  However, if the bin is too large, information that is critical 
might go missing causing a device to be falsely identified.  Empirically the authors 
determined the best bin size was where the time value for the bins was 300, 𝑛𝑛 = 300.  Once 
a signature is generated the third stage, similarity measure, to check for similarities against a 
master database using a neural network to determine a match value ranging from 0 to 1 
where 1 is a perfect match.   The results are passed on to stage four, enrollment.  In this stage 
the signatures are passed through two neural nets, one for device type and the second for 
device id.  In this case, there are three possible outcomes: recognized device and type, 
recognize the type but not the device, do not recognize the type or the device. The biggest 
drawback to this methodology appeared to be the scalability of the model which experienced 
a linear decrease in the successful identification of a device in correlation with the number of 
devices on a network as shown below in the graph reproduced from the paper. 
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Figure 2 – Recall vs Number of Devices 
 
As the authors note, “The two most important factors that affect time associated with GTID’s 
decision process are capture time and processing time [82].”  Increasing the sample size 
resulted in increased time for capture.  And if the packet size or sample size is increased then 
the processing time of the sample size also increases.  Efforts made to reduce the time by 
multi-threading the methodology did result in a decrease in the over-all time but still 
reflected an increase in time from the smaller packet samples.   
 Another methodology for device fingerprinting in a poly network is using sensor 
fingerprinting to identify a mobile device.  Bojinov, Boneh, Michalevsky, and Nakibly cover 
this approach in their paper, “Mobile Device Identification via Sensor Fingerprinting.”   
 Most mobile devices i.e. tablets and smartphones today include the following 
features, speakers, microphone, accelerometer and can be divided into essentially two major 
eco-systems Android or Apple (iOS).  In Bojinov, et al, noted there are multiple features 
within the mobile device area that have slight imperfections that can when aggregated allow 
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for device identification.  These features and their type of imperfections, a linear bias, 
tolerance, or timing are noted in the table below. 
Table 1 - Mobile Device Sensors 
Sensor Imperfection 
Audio Tolerance gain 
Accelerometer Linear bias 
Gyroscope Linear bias 
Magnetometer Linear bias 
Ambient light Linear bias 
GPS Clock skew 
Touch screen Misalignment 
Camera Pattern noise 
 
Linear bias is defined as true value versus measured value.  Where the sensitivity S of the 
device being measured and the offset O of the sensor form part of the measurement.  In 
theory, Sensitivity should be equal to 1 and offset should be equal to 0.  However, in practice 
there are small imperfections that are measurable so, measure value equals true value with 
sensitivity and offset as factors, thus you end up with 𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚 = 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 + 𝑂𝑂.  After reviewing the 
various sensors, the research team determined the results of several sensors are not 
immediately available through the mobile connection, however microphone-speaker and the 
accelerometer results could be accessed through the wireless connection.   
When using the microphone-combination, “the fingerprinting system uses the 
speakers to emit a sequence of sounds at different frequencies and records the resulting 
signals using the microphone. The fingerprint is computed by looking at amplitude 
and frequency distortions in the recorded signals [11].  Since the observer is eliciting a 
response form the device, this is an active method of fingerprinting.  The central 
measurement of microphone and speakers is the frequency response.  In both, the frequency 
is normalized over a given range, in the case of the microphone the normalization occurs in 
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the output gain, in the speaker equally output audio intensity is normalized.  Again, due to 
slight manufacturing imperfections the frequency response of microphone-speaker is not 
identical.  Manufacturing tolerances are such that a typical tolerance is ±2db and it is this 
various that allows for the use of the microphone-speaker combination.  This method is a 
little unique for device fingerprinting and does not work unless the device is equipped with 
both a microphone and speaker.  Because you will stimulate the speaker to produce a sound 
and record it with the microphone and note the difference between the original intensity and 
the recorded intensity, this is called the feedback ratio.  The whole process looks something 
like the figure below: 
 
 
Using this method, a specific harmonic frequency was noted to produce the correct tolerance 
so as a specific machine could be isolated.  This frequency was recorded in three different 
acoustical environments allowed the team to record signatures for the device.  These 
signatures were then enrolled in a database.  “Given enough samples, the group was able to 
estimate the mean and variance of the distribution [11].  When the device was encountered 
later the team could correctly identify it 95% of the time.  Of course, the main drawback to 
this method is the use of frequencies the device is stimulated to produce.  It would be hard to 
Original 
signal 
Recorded 
signal 
Feedback 
Ratio 
Figure 3 - Measuring Feedback Ratio 
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stealth this method unless using a set of frequencies that were either above or below the 
normal hearing range.  The accelerometer method does not suffer from this drawback. 
 As you are aware, the accelerometer measures force along a three-axis continuum 
allowing the device to adjust the screen to either portrait or landscape as well as serve as a 
pedometer. An advantage of using the accelerometer is in normal use the user will place the 
device on a stable surface creating a given value, g. This is observed because the 
accelerometer value is relatively static.  “What is more, iOS as well as Android browsers 
expose this functionality to websites without notifying the user [11].” Unlike the 
microphone-speaker combination, there is no way to feed values into the accelerometer.  
Instead the passive observer must rely on the user moving about and collect enough 
observation to estimate the accelerometer’s calibrations.  The first measurement to be 
collected is the effect of gravity on the device since “the Z axis will register practically all the 
acceleration due to Earth’s gravity [11].”  Since the device is unknown two measurements 
are needed, device face up 𝑍𝑍𝑚𝑚+ and device facedown 𝑍𝑍𝑚𝑚− this will allow you determine the 
value for Sz, or the sensitivity along the Z axis.  We can do this by using the following: 
𝑆𝑆𝑧𝑧 = 𝑍𝑍𝑚𝑚+ −  𝑍𝑍𝑚𝑚−2𝑔𝑔  
𝑂𝑂𝑧𝑧 = (𝑍𝑍𝑚𝑚+ + 𝑍𝑍𝑚𝑚−)2  
Then to find the accelerometer bias, deviation from true value, multiple measurements were 
made, 𝑋𝑋𝑚𝑚
(𝑖𝑖),𝑌𝑌𝑚𝑚(𝑖𝑖),𝑍𝑍𝑚𝑚(𝑖𝑖) as many as could be gathered and then fed through the optimization 
problem 
Minimize ∑ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖2𝑖𝑖  subject to the following as reproduced from Appendix B of the research, ((𝑋𝑋𝑚𝑚(𝑖𝑖) −𝑂𝑂𝑥𝑥)/𝑆𝑆𝑥𝑥)2 +  ((𝑌𝑌𝑚𝑚(𝑖𝑖) − 𝑂𝑂𝑦𝑦)/𝑆𝑆𝑦𝑦)2 + ((𝑍𝑍𝑚𝑚(𝑖𝑖) − 𝑂𝑂𝑧𝑧)/𝑆𝑆𝑧𝑧)2 − 𝑔𝑔2 = 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 
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Where i is the index measurement.  Applying this to multiple sets of measurements for each 
device allows for labelled samples in 6-dimensional space. “Then use nearest neighbor 
matching (KNN) to associate the sample with a labeled cluster. Cross-validation of KNN 
classification over this data yielded a correct classification percentage of 81.3% [11].”  As 
you can note there is a high probability of device identification using these two methods for 
mobile devices containing at a minimum a microphone/speaker and an accelerometer with 
the drawback that one will emit frequencies and the second will require extended periods of 
observation.  In the end, the hardware based only method has some drawbacks as was noted 
in covering the research into this methodology. 
 
2.2  Hardware and software characteristics to identify a device 
 Another method of device fingerprinting includes the use of a hybrid of hardware and 
software to identify a device.  In “Active Behavioral Fingerprinting of Wireless Devices,” the 
team of Bratus, Corneliius, Kotz, and Peebles (Bratus, et al) propose a solution based upon 
the chipsets of wireless cards, their drivers or the firmware.  In their solution, they send 
malformed 802.11 frames and observe the responses, claiming the responses different 
sufficiently to allow for device identification.  This approach is based upon the concept that 
different implementations of the 802.11 standard will respond differently and their research 
appears to back up their claim.  This is also an example of the active technique of device 
fingerprinting in that the observer causes the device to send information which can be used in 
its identification.  This same method of using the device coupled with driver behavior is also 
advocated in “Passive Data Link layer 802.11 Wireless Device Driver Fingerprinting,” 
authored by Franklin, McCoy, Tabriz, Neagoe, Van Randwyk, and Sicker (Franklin et al).  
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Their approach is completely passive with the only requirement being the attacker “needs to 
be able to monitor the wireless traffic from the fingerprintee [27].”  It makes use of lack of an 
explicitly defined algorithm for scanning for access points (AP).  “This lack of an explicit 
specification for a probing algorithm in the 802.11 standard has led to the development of 
many wireless device drivers that perform this function entirely differently than other 
wireless device drivers [27].”  The approach is also unique in that it does not require a device 
to be connected, it just requires the device to be probing for a connection.  The approach uses 
a two-stage process.  During the first phase, the observer monitors for 802.11 traffic, 
capturing it in a trace.  In the second phase using a supervised Bayesian approach the 
information is first binned.  This allows for smooth of the data.  The team then chose two 
values of specific interest during the data analysis phase, “frequency of delta arrival time 
values between probe request frames. The second attribute was the average, for each 
bin, of all actual (non-rounded) delta arrival time values of the probe request frames placed in 
that bin [27].”  This allowed for attribute characterizing the size of the bin and a second 
attribute describing the mean of the bin. The signature for each driver was created by 
recording the percentage of all probe request frames in each bin combining it with the 
average of all actual delta arrival time for the probe request frames in the bin.  This value is 
then placed into the master database of signatures.  Once this is done then you would 
calculate closeness to see if the trace you have captures has already been identified. 
 To calculate closeness on the trace you have acquired, first create a signature, S using 
the method described above.  Then you will let pn be the percentage of the nth bin of S.  The 
mean value of all probe requests in the nth bin is expressed as mn.  From here we will use D 
to represent all the signatures in the master signature database, with d standing for a single 
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signature from the database. Let yn and xn respectively be the percentage of probe request 
frames and the mean of all probe request frames in the nth bin of d.  Using the following 
equation you will calculate closeness, C representing the distance value. 
𝐶𝐶 = min (∀𝑏𝑏 ∈ 𝐷𝐷�(|𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
0
− 𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛|+𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛|𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 − 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛|)) 
This is run reiteratively through all the bins in S summing the difference of the percentages 
and mean differences scaled by the percentage. The mean differences are scaled by the d bin 
percentage to prevent this value from dominating the bin percentage differences.  This 
provides success in appropriately identifying the signature of the wireless driver in the trace 
ranging from 96% accuracy to 77% accuracy.  The highest percent of accuracy obtained with 
a large data set and relatively uncluttered environment with the lowest result obtained 
through a very noisy environment cluttered with multiple signal sources.   
Both of these methods rely upon the 802.11 frameset which may limit the 
effectiveness to wireless devices and while the wireless sea of devices is constantly 
expanding when addressing network security any solution would need to take into account 
what I have called a poly network.   
 
2.3  User behavior to identify a device 
 The third method while not primarily used for device fingerprinting can be used to 
associate a user with a specific device.  This methodology relies upon user behavior and is 
predicated upon the concept that user behavior can be predictive and unique.  “Adaptive 
Authentication based on Analysis of user Behavior” authored by Abu Bakar and Haron 
illustrates the use of this method for the purposes of authentication.  A second interesting 
paper in this area of research is titled, “802.11 User Fingerprinting.”  In this paper the authors 
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show there are four implicit identifiers that allow for identification of users even with MAC 
addresses hidden and user ID and IP addresses not available.  These four identifiers are: 
network destinations, network names advertised in 802.11 probes, differing configurations of 
802.11 options, and size of packet broadcasts. Using these identifiers, the researchers were 
able to develop a tool to automate the process of identification and with a high degree of 
accuracy identify individuals during a conference.  Furthermore, this tool worked even when 
the link layer was encrypted.  With this methodology, several hundred users were explicitly 
identified while attending a major conference. In reviewing the sample of information 
collected s during the conference the team asked a simple question did this traffic come from 
a specific user?  To answer the question, the team of Pang, Greenstein, Gummadi, Seshan, 
and Wetherall established a classifier for each user, 𝐶𝐶𝑢𝑢.  If the traffic sample t comes from 
the user, then Cu returns a yes, else no.  So, from each traffic sample a vector of features was 
extracted, (𝑓𝑓1, … ,𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚). “For each feature fi, they estimate the posterior probability distribution 
Pr[t has fi |t is from U] and the prior probability distribution Pr[t has fi ] from training 
data.”[p6]  Using a second formula if the value is calculated to be higher than the threshold T 
then the sample is from U.  This formula is displayed below, remember the key question is 
did the traffic sample t from a specific user and does it have (𝑓𝑓_1, … , 𝑓𝑓_𝑚𝑚).    So we end up 
with Pr[t is from U|t has(𝑓𝑓1, … ,𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚) =   
∏ (Pr[𝑡𝑡 ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖|𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 𝑈𝑈]) ∙ Pr [𝑡𝑡 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 𝑈𝑈]𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖
∏ Pr [𝑡𝑡 ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖]𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖  
Is this value is greater than the threshold T then this sample is from U.  From there using the 
training data, a user profile is constructed Profileu.  This profile contains all the elements in 
union with the training sample from the user U. In addition, some features have more weight 
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than others based upon the occurrence, reoccurrence within a user’s traffic sample. These 
values are then compared with the feature found in the user profile. 
The drawback to the method is the threshold. Without a priori knowledge, the 
adversary has to select a threshold that results in a false positive result that is acceptable to 
the attacker. This work will re-manifest itself the related topic, authentication or re-
authentication and in chapter three of this paper we will see how user behavior can play a 
role in continuous re-authentication of the user using a device already fingerprinted.  As a 
side note, user behavior is a little explored are of fingerprinting for purposes of device 
identification. User behavior has been explored in authentication schemes and we will review 
this some of this literature in our quest to provide a secure, usable solution that accomplishes 
the definition for authentication provided earlier the process of verifying an identity 
presented and the device it was used to present. 
 
2.4   Browser or software used to identify a device  
The fourth methodology for device fingerprinting involves chartering the software 
differences. This can be done effectively by using the common interface between the internet 
and the device, a browser. In their paper, “Cookieless Monster: Exploring the Ecosystem of 
Web-Based Device Fingerprinting,” Nikiforakis, Kapravelos, Joosen, Kruegel, Piessens, and 
Vigna (Nikiforakis et al) explore the world of browser fingerprinting, how it is used to 
identify a device and by extension the user, and how pervasive and persist across the Internet.  
From 1994 until now cookies have been a part of the browser eco-system.  They are 
prevalent today as you can see from clip of a screen shot taken using Windows 10 Edge 
browser of a popular news site.    
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Spread throughout the Internet sites, the use of these files to track users across multiple 
domains, and sites and “their direct connection with online behavioral advertising, captured 
the attention of both the research community and the popular media outlets and, ever since, 
cause the public’s discomfort [63].”  An EU workgroup set up under the aegis of the 
Directorate of Fundamental Rights and Union Citizenship, ruled in 2002 that cookies 
violated a citizen’s fundamental right to privacy. And in 2009 went so far as to say, that 
before a site can use cookies they must obtain a citizen’s prior consent.  Browsers even 
incorporated a setting for deleting cookies upon exit from a browser. These developments 
pushed advertisers and data aggregators to find new and different ways to track users across 
the web and from website to website. When it was uncovered, that browsers are fairly unique 
from device to device the concept of exploiting this uniqueness was advanced. Today, there 
are several commercial firms, Qualia, Iovation, and Threatmetrix that boast of large 
databases of device fingerprints using the browser eco-system as their methodology for 
developing each unique fingerprint. The three primary methods of using the browser echo 
systems exploit features available not only in the browsers but also in popular add-ons such 
as Adobe Flash and Java. Peter Eckersley, in his paper “How Unique is your Browser?”, 
presented in 2010 at the International Symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies 
Symposium estimated that out of a sample size of 470,161 the odds of two having the same 
signature had odds of 1 in 286,777.  The odds increased if Java or Adobe Flash was present.  
Figure 4 - BBC's statement of their cookie policy 
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The table below reflects the items that were measured to determine browser uniqueness and 
thereby device uniqueness. 
Table 2 - Browser Measurements used in Panopticlick Fingerprints 
Variable Source   
User Agent Transmitted by HTP, logged 
by server 
 Contains    
version,     
info. 
HTTP ACCEPT headers Transmitted by HTP, logged 
by server 
  
Cookies enabled Inferred in HTTP, logged by 
server 
  
Screen resolution Javascript   
Timezone Javascript   
Browser plugins, plugin 
versions, and MIME type 
Javascript  Sorted b   
System Fonts Flash/Java applet  Not sorte  
Partial Super cookie test Javasxcript  No test f      
cookies.      
DOM G  
 
Later research by Nikiforakis et al revealed additionally, “the order of property-enumeration 
of special browser objects, like the navigator and screen objects, is consistently 
different between browser families, versions of each browser, and, in some cases, among 
deployments of the same version on different operating systems [64].”  This adds additional 
information that the observer can use to fingerprint a specific browser on a specific device 
and by extension the device itself. 
 As we can see from this chapter, it is possible to uniquely identify the device whether 
through clock skews, or a combination of hardware/software, user behavior, or browsers. In 
some cases, the behavior of the user is such that we can identify the user through passive data 
collection. In today’s modern networks with their multiple devices and with some users 
having several devices that they use for their connectivity, devices ranging from smart 
phones and tablets to the traditional workstation or laptop, it is important to be able to 
25 
 
identify the not only the device but if possible the user. Not only is it important to identify 
the device but to tie the device to the user so that each user can access the resources they 
need regardless of the device they use to access the network. 
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CHAPTER 3 
APPROACHES TO AUTHENTICATION 
The process of authenticating an identity has been the point of attack of attack since 
earliest times.  In the movies, the sentry calls out, “Who is there?”  The user replies with his 
name at which point in the protocol he is challenged to provide the sign for that night.  This 
was so only authorized soldiers, and not the enemy were allowed into the circle of trust, the 
camp.  In todays’ digital world, we often approach a workstation to login into our work and 
the computer provides a screen that in effect says, “Who’s there?”  We enter our credentials, 
whether it is a user name or a token and immediately are challenged to produce the password, 
our sign.  Some sites, require the user to change their password every 30-60-90 days 
depending on the anxiety of the security personnel. Others require passwords that are not 
words and must have a mix of numbers, special characters, uppercase and lowercase letters.  
Still other sites are fine with a password that is a minimum of 8 characters long.  Access to 
the internet has grown and exposure of services to the internet has exploded over recent 
years.  “An average user accesses about 20 different accounts in a day, which are generally 
accessed through password based authentication mechanisms. It has become overwhelming 
for users to remember so many passwords and therefore they have resorted to typically three 
main approaches to overcome the friction:  1) users use the same password across multiple 
SPs; 2) users note their passwords on a piece of paper or their personal mobile devices; 
and/or 3) users use shortcut helper functions such as “remember my password” features on 
browsers [73].”  As the apparent requirement for a stronger authentication mechanism has 
grown, various solutions have been offered. In this chapter I will briefly review the 
terminology of multi-factor authentication, define the process, review the research, the 
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extensible authentication protocol, and review one of the remaining issues in most 
authentications schemes. 
 
3.1 Terminology for multi-factor authentication 
In discussing multi-factor authentication there is common terminology.  But, as you read 
the literature covering this area, it quickly becomes apparent that not everyone means the 
same thing when using certain words.  Words such as authentication can be narrow as in 
“Authentication Systems of Internet of Things,” where it is defined as “Authentication is the 
process of confirming one’s identity;” or expanded as in “A User Authentication Protocol 
based on Multiple Factors,” where “User authentication is a process of verifying the user’s 
identity with reliable methods.”  Then while there is general agreement in the existence of 
such terms as two-factor, three factor, and four factor authentication; where a particular 
methodology belongs can be a source of disagreement.  One set of researchers classify 
username/password as a single factor authentication, the username is the identity to be 
verified.  Others place the same methodology in two factor authentication insisting the 
username functions not only as an identity but also as a factor of authentication.   Clarity as 
to which it is, single or two factor is obtained by understanding what is meant by the four 
different phrases. 
The best statement regarding this begins with understanding the four factors, 
“Authentication is classically divided into four distinct categories: Something You Are, e.g.,      
biometric authentication; Something You Do, e.g., behavior based authentication; Something 
You Know, which relies on information from user memory; and Something You Possess, 
which typically extends protection by verifying possession of some physical element such as 
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a key fob, for example [73]”  For the purposes of this paper I want to define the four factors 
providing a consistent frame of reference.  For the purposes of multi-factor authentication, a 
single factor authentication is simply presentation of a credential to validate a previously 
produced identity.  In two factor, multi-factor authentication, it is the presentation of two 
separate credentials. In three and four factor, multi-factor authentication, it is the presentation 
of three and four, respectively, sets of credentials.  Note nothing is said that the credentials 
must be separate and unique in the classical taxonomy.  Thus, it is possible to have two 
sources of what you know, of three sources of what you know, or a mixture of what you 
know, who you are, and what you have. 
As we have defined authentication earlier using the IEEE definition, we need to 
understand the goal of authentication.  In NIST SP 800-63-2, Electronic Authentication 
Guidelines, there is a clear statement of the purpose of authentication.  “Authentication 
establishes confidence in the Claimant’s identity, and in some cases in the Claimant’s 
personal attributes (for example the Subscriber is a US Citizen, is a student at a particular 
university, or is assigned a particular number or code by an agency or organization).  
Authentication does not determine the Claimant’s authorizations or access privileges; this is a 
separate decision [14].”  Claimant in this case is the entity, whether person or machine 
presenting the identity.  In the next section, we will explore the process used to accomplish 
the goal. 
 
3.2 Authentication as a process 
In the introduction, we discussed how identification, authentication, and authorization 
and a map to illustrate the process.  We are now going to look at the sub-process, identified 
with a darker shade of color in the figure below:  
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Figure 5 - Authentication sub-process 
 
This part of the process consists of several actors; we have the requestor or claimant.  This is 
the entity presenting the identification for validation.  We have the entity seeking verification 
of the credentials presented, in NIST SP 800-63-2 referred to as the verifier.  The information 
is referred to a third party for verification the claimed identity is valid and belongs to a 
subscriber, a legitimate user of the information system.  This third party maybe called a 
relying party (RP) or a credential service provider (CSP).  The relying party will review the 
information provided, valid that information against an internal source, often this is a 
database of credential information, and the provides a yes/no validation response to the 
verifier.  If the answer is no, a token for authorization will be granted and the claimant 
validated as a subscriber is able to use what resources they are authorized.  In some cases, the 
RA is not the CSP in those cases the RP acts as a middle entity passing the information both 
ways isolating the verifier from the CSP.  The whole process as described above is seen in 
this next figure which comes from the NIST publication. 
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The CSP is required to maintain information about the Claimant.  In some cases, the 
information has an expiration date on it.  Other cases, this information, while not considered 
a good security practice, have an unlimited life.  Applying multi-factor authentication to this 
process you can see that the validation process in effect validates each piece of information 
collectively.  In some cases, there may be multiple CSPs but in most cases the CSP is a single 
entity.    
 
3.3 Research 
There is a wide variety of research occurring in multi-factor authentication.  Some of that 
research occurs in each of the areas of multi-factor authentication:  knowledge-based, 
possession based (biometric or token), behavior based, and physical based.  This paper will 
explore some of the relevant information currently being advanced.   Any good 
authentication process will have to take into account a major stakeholder, the users.  A recent 
internal study by Intel revealed, “users desire security but not at the expense of convenience 
Figure 6 - NIST Authentication Process 
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[77]."  In, “A Multi-factor Re-authentication Framework with user Privacy,” it was noted 
there are essentially three user requirements for any authentication method.  The first is, the 
method should be user-friendly i.e. not forcing the user to re-enter primary factor, or a 
password, at intervals.  The second requirement is it should protect the user’s privacy even if 
the method is based upon user characteristics and those characteristics are stored on 
authentication servers.  The last factor is the method should be fairly quick in its resolution of 
authentication. Simply put any solution S will have to ensure the user’s discomfort level U 
remains below a threshold of 1 where 1 is the level at which the user will resist 
implementation or implement their own work around,  𝑆𝑆 = 0 < 𝑈𝑈 < 1. With that we begin 
looking at some of the research in authentication. 
 Following our types of factors provided earlier we will look at, knowledge based as a 
factor in the authentication.  In their paper, “New Factor of Authentication: Something You 
Process,” the team of Shakir Ullah Shah, Fazl-e-Hadi, and Abid Ali Minhas suggest a form 
of the puzzle solving for user authentication.  While they call this something you process, for 
easy classification purposes we will place it in the knowledge based authentication.  This is 
called formula based authentication.  In this method, the user self identifies and the system 
then provides a formula which varies upon each log in.  For example, the system would 
present the formula, A+B-C = 14.  The user resolves the formula, providing their answer as 
part of their presentation of credentials.  One of the pros the authors present for their system 
is that “It saves the time wasted by entering wrong password as humans do by allowing the 
user to see the result of the formula [72].”  I would argue that those who are math challenged 
or numerically dyslexic would find this type of methodology challenging. 
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 In the area of possession based authentication, there are several papers.    In 
developing their concept, the team of Chun-I Fan and Yi-Hui Lin, in their paper titled, 
“Provably Secure Remote Truly Three-Factor Authentication Scheme with Privacy 
Protection on Biometrics,” are responding to two problems with biometric characteristics 
used in remote authentication.  The first is, some biometric characteristics may be easily 
obtained and they can never be changed, which makes these biometric characteristics 
unreliable as encryption keys. Second, the biometric capture devices are remotely located. 
The server cannot check whether the device is capable of verifying that a person is alive 
[24].”  In their solution they propose a three factor authentication method that contains, 
something have, something you know, and something you are.  In our authentication 
taxonomy, this is reduced three factors but physical (something you possess), knowledge 
based, (something you know), and physical (something you are).  The method has three 
phases, 1) initialization, 2) registration, and 3) login and authentication.  In the initialization 
phase the user is not an actor, the server prepares a set of security parameters. Including in 
this is a private-public key set (sk,pk) and a secret key set (x,sk).   This is required in order to 
keep the user biometric data secure.  In phase two the user is a very active agent.  In this 
phase the user will execute five steps registering to the server.  In step one of the registration 
the user Ui chooses a random string r and picks a password PWi. Scans their iris and creates a 
template, Si.  So 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖  𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟(𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖) = 𝑓𝑓 ⊕  𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 .  In step two sends the password and 
the biometric template to the server using a one-way hash.  In step three the server will 
compute and ID and store in the ID table.  At this point the server will send the user a smart 
card.  In step five the user using the smart card will encrypt the random number from step 1 
with the biometric template and stores the resulting sketch in the smart card.  In the login and 
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authentication stage the seven steps.  In step one, the user will login using the password and 
allow for an iris scan 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖∗.  Then using the smart card retrieves r from the sketch and then 
computes the iris scan and using the ID and the public key from the server encrypts 
deriving 𝐶𝐶0.  In step two the user sends the derived value to the server.  The server decrypts 
the derived value using its secret key.  Obtains the ID and the iris scan, compare the values to 
the values stored in its ID table in step three.  In the fourth step, the server then computes a 
new derived value and sends it to the user.  The user in step five will use this value to extract 
a value checking to ensure the value came from the server and finally gets a value, v, to be 
used in a session key.  Then the user computes a new derived value, 𝐶𝐶2.  In step six the user 
sends the new derived value to the server. Finally, in step seven the server will use the value 
computed in step three from the derived value, to decrypt the newly arrived derived value, 
making certain this was sent by the user.  Then it checks to see if the hashed password sent 
matches the hashed password stored in the registration phase and if the score between the 
two iris scans meet the predefined threshold value set.  If so the server returns true accepting 
the login in request.  Using this methodology, the team contents it has accomplished four 
goals, message content authentication, message origin authentication, general identity 
authentication, and session key material provided. 
 A paper in the physical based area is titled, “Four-Factor based Privacy Preserving 
Biometric Authentication and Authorization Scheme for Enhancing Grid Security” from the 
team of G. Jaspher Willsie Kathrine and E. Kirubakaran builds on the work above by adding 
a fourth factor, someplace where the user is, also known as geographically based 
authentication.  This type of approach is to “enhance the security criteria required for a vast 
distributed system” i.e. the military, banking, medical, or research environments.  The paper 
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refers to such organizations as virtual organizations (VO).  It also adds a security framework 
for this grid of virtual organizations.  The security component it proposes to add is three main 
subgroups.  A security client (SC), a security manager, (SM), and a chief security manager 
(CSM).  In adding the location feature to the previous framework, the team proposes adding 
to more variables to document these features, the first is the dynamic user ID (CID). The 
second variable is the dynamic service ID, (SID).  Then adding two final variables to handle 
the geographic location, (posi) for the location information attached to the user and (poss) for 
the location information attached to the server.  The three phases remain essentially the same 
as the previous paper except the login and authentication phase are separated.  This because 
the new variables are added in this last phase.   So in the first step of the last phase where the 
user created a derived value from the following formula: 𝐶𝐶0 = 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖‖𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖‖𝑐𝑐 where u was 
randomly chosen by the user and epk denotes the server’s public key encryption function 
using the public key from the server the paper adds the nonce posi so the formula for the 
derived value now looks like this: 𝐶𝐶0 = 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑀𝑀‖𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖‖𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖‖𝑐𝑐‖𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖), the smart card previously 
computing M as 𝑀𝑀 = (𝐾𝐾⊕ 𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑢).   In step three of the previous paper the server now 
computes a derived value as follows: 𝐶𝐶1 = 𝐸𝐸𝑢𝑢(𝑁𝑁‖𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷‖𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼‖𝑣𝑣‖𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠).  The added values to 
the formula are the computer generated nonce 𝑁𝑁 = (𝐾𝐾⊕ 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠) and the server’s position poss.  
This contains each time the derived value is calculated, adding a nonce to prove liveness and 
the positional data as an additional authentication value.  In effect the authors added two new 
values, not just the geographic one.  The paper shows how using the calculated nonce as part 
of the user ID this protects against the ID theft attack.  Additionally, the time performance of 
the four factor authentication scheme was also reviewed and replacing the one way hash with 
the XOR function saves time.  
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 There is additional work using location based services as a fourth factor in multifactor 
authentication.  In some they use the GPS position [1] and in others they use a signal 
property [78]. 
The next set of work on multi-factor authentication is behavior based.  Behavior 
based encompasses a range of solutions, using the user behavior.  Two of our resource papers 
refer to user behavior by using the mouse and keyboard.  A third paper takes a more macro 
stance in regards to user behavior.  One of the more interesting thoughts in regard to user 
behavior is the use of this approach in a form of continuous authentication, or 
reauthentication.  This type of use would address a perceived weakness in the current model 
which is; once authenticated, how does the system ensure the entity originally authenticated 
is the entity that uses the services and resources of the system.  In their paper, “Combining 
Keystroke and Mouse Dynamics for Continuous User Authentication and Identification,” 
Sourmik Mondal and Patrick Bours (Mondal and Bours), introduce two concepts, static 
authentication (SA) and continuous authentication (CA).  As they define SA there is a once 
time authentication and “the legitimacy of the user is assumed to be the same during the full 
session.”  The weakness to this approach one of them is the user leaving the system unlocked 
while no one is there.  The suggested solution is a form of ensuring the entity that 
authenticated is the same entity for the whole of the session.  Mondal and Bours call this CA.  
They accomplish it by continuously monitoring the entity’s (in this case the user’s) behavior 
during the session based upon a biometric signature left on the device.  As they point out this 
is not an alternative to SA but CA is intended to complement SA.  As was pointed out earlier 
users want security but not at the point of being inconvenienced.  This method is unobtrusive 
due to the nature of the behavioral biometrics; keyboard dynamics (KD) and mouse 
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dynamics (MD).  The first step in this is feature extraction.  This is achieved by encoding 
every keystroke k as 𝑘𝑘 = (𝐴𝐴,𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝,𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟) where Tp,Tr are the timestamps of the key press and 
release in milliseconds and A is the value of the key pressed.  These events are then 
converted into two different actions, one, single key action and the other is key digraph 
action.  In the single key action, the feature vector is 𝐹𝐹𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 = (𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖), where Ai is the ith key, 
and di is the duration of the ith pressed key (i.e. 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 = 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 − 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝).  In the diagraph key action, 
two consecutive keystrokes are considered a diagraph action when the latency between the 
two is less than 2000ms.   The diagraph key action feature vector is represented by 𝐹𝐹𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 =
𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖, 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝, 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟, 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝), where ti is the total time duration of two consecutive keystrokes.  𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝, 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟, and 
𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝are the latencies between the ith and (𝑖𝑖 + 1)𝑡𝑡ℎ keys such that 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 = 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖+1𝑝𝑝 − 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 , 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 =
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖+1
𝑟𝑟 − 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖
𝑟𝑟 ,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖+1𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 = 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖+1𝑝𝑝 − 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝.  Each mouse event is converted to four different activities, 
mouse single click, mouse double click, mouse move, and mouse drop-drag.  Mouse single 
click measures the duration between mouse click and release and is similar to the single 
action.  The double click is similar to the diagraph key action only the duration between the 
two clicks has a threshold of 1000ms.  The mouse move is a sequence of mouse move events.  
The mouse drop and drag while similar to the mouse move event must first begin with a 
mouse click and followed by a mouse release.  The next section to provide training data sets 
for each user.  In their experiment Modal and Bours found that one data set was insufficient 
to achieve desired results and they required multiple training data sets for each user.  Once 
these sets were provided to the continuous authentication system (CAS) and the continuous 
identification system (CIS) they were able to achieve a measurable success rate.  CAS 
worked with the notation that it took an average of 471 actions to detect and imposter with an 
average accuracy of 61.3%.  The CIS was able to accomplish its target with fewer events, 
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333 actions on average before it detected the imposter with an average accuracy of 58.9%.  
Another finding was addition higher accuracy was achieved using the KD versus the MD. 
A similar paper, “A Novel Approach to Design of User Re-Authentication Systems,’ 
by Harini Jagadeesan and Michael S. Hsiao (Jagadeesan and Hsiao) uses the same KD and 
MD of the previous authors but adds an additional constraint during the training data set, 
using pre-determined tasks.  In addition, while Mondal and Bours collected four events for 
the mouse Jagadeesan and Hsiao collected 10 events, including mouse speed and acceleration 
in all directions.  After using the broad indicators general speed and acceleration to classify a 
user, the more specific mouse movement (directional speed) allowed for a narrower 
identification of the user.  The use of the keystroke diagraph was limited to 50 of the more 
commonly occurring keystroke diagraphs.  These keyboard diagraphs were accomplished by 
choosing ten different articles from popular magazines and a frequency analysis was done.  
The two sets of events were also compared to produce a mouse to keyboard interaction ratio.  
The framework of their method consisted of two different engines, the first is an 
environmental engine which collects the data from the keyboard and the mouse.  These 
values are then passed to the analysis engine. “The analysis engine applies three heuristics to 
data passed to it and provides the most probable user match from the database [45].”  The 
user match is provided back to the environmental block which then validates that this is the 
“logged in user”.  If there is a non-match, then the event is logged.  After a certain threshold 
of non-matches is reached the user is logged out and must begin the authentication process.  
Just as Mondal and Bours had to do this framework also requires two data sets for each user.  
The first data set is from the constrained training phase where the user performs a number of 
pre-defined tasks.  After a profile is established during this phase, the second phase, 
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verification is entered.  During this phase the user is no longer constrained but independently 
accomplishes tasks for a pre-set period of time and the results are collected in a profile. The 
combination of the profile obtained from the two data sessions, training and verification 
becomes the user profile.  While accuracy of their framework was high it was noted that the 
increased number of users led to lower accuracy results in some cases.  One other conclusion 
was provided of note, that this type of framework will require periodic re-training to account 
for the subtle changes that occur in a person’s behavior over time. 
Another set of researchers, Khairul Azmi Abu Bakar and Galoh Rashidah Haron 
(Bakar and Haron), wrote a paper, “Adaptive Authentication base on Analysis of user 
Behavior.”  This framework uses an authentication system called Unified Authentication 
Platform (UAP).  The UAP architecture is depicted in the figure below: 
 
Adaptive UAP has two primary processes, pattern generation and trust evaluation.  During 
the pattern generation process the user’s behavior from past logins is analyzed and a profile 
is developed.  This is accomplished by reviewing the event storage what has context records 
Figure 7 - UAP architecture 
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about each user.  In this study’s case the primary context records used were: the login time, 
user geolocation, application accesses, the type of browser, and the operating system.  Each 
of these items were given a specific weight.  The pattern generation process is a reiterative 
process that runs primarily during non-peak low usage hours as it consumes a lot of computer 
power in reviewing all the past records from the last 14 days for all the users in the system.   
In this manner, you have a constant refreshing user profile based on recent user behavior. 
 The second process is the trust evaluating process.  This process occurs upon every 
login request form a user.   Containing five components, context collector, patterns storage, 
trust calculator, challenger, and events storage, the trust evaluation will run through the 
process using the time clock from the server as part of its process.  Central to the process, the 
trust calculator “compares the current contexts processed by the context collector with the 
user attribute profiles retrieved from the pattern storage to decide the total trust score of the 
user [3].”  From there the challenger component will review the user’s score form the trust 
calculator, matching it against the threshold for a specific application the user wants access to 
and provide one of three response, grant access, request additional input for user, or block the 
user. 
 While the UAP framework is adaptable and flexible it has a high overhead in that as 
the system gains more users, the number of records stored increases as does the processing 
time for creating the user profile.  This would argue again the framework being scalable to an 
enterprise level. 
 
3.4  Extensible Authentication Protocol 
 As part of the survey in the research ongoing in the area of entity authentication, we 
need to look at the use of the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP).  The primary reason 
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for doing this is because EAP is concerned with the three As in network usage, 
authentication, authorization, and accounting.  For the first one alone, authentication, we 
would need to review this literature.  Because the solution we posit for a variety of issues in 
network authentication and usage will require the use of one of the various methods that 
spring out the EAP standards.  To do this I am going to look at three items, two of them 
research papers and the last is the RFCS for EAP in particular the following, RFC 3748, RFC 
4962, RFC 5216, and RFC 5247. 
 The first research paper is, “A Practical Analysis of EAP Authentication Methods,” 
by Alexandra Chiornita, Laura Gheorghe, and Daniel Rosner (Chiornita, et al).  This paper 
reviews the different EAP methods used in the IEEE 802.1x Port Based Network Access 
Control comparing the most common types.  These are listed in the table below: 
Table 3  - Common EAP methods 
Name Code Required/Optional Developed by Features 
LEAP 17 Optional Developed by Cisco, 
now standard 
Cannot use 
certificates 
EAP-MD5 4 Required IEEE – RFC 3748 Cannot use 
certificates 
EAP-TLS 13 Optional IEEE – RFC 5216 Certificate- 
based 
PEAP 25 Optional Developed by Cisco, 
now standard 
Certificate- 
based 
EAP-PSK  Optional IEEE – RFC 4764 Certificate- 
based 
EAP-IKEv2  Optional IEEE – RFC 5106 Certificate- 
based or 
password 
based 
EAP-FAST 43 Optional Developed by Cisco, 
now standard (RFC 
4851) 
Certificate- 
based 
EAP-SIM 18 Optional IEEE – RFC 4186  
EAP-AKA 23 Optional IEEE – RFC 4187  
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This paper reviews the impact of the three most common methods in EAP-MD5, EAP-TLS, 
and EAP-PEAP.  The first one is mandatory for any device which implements EAP.  One 
issue is that it offers minimum security, requiring only the supplicant to authenticate to the 
server.  Bi-directional or mutual authentication is not supported.  “Because it is based on 
MD5 hash function, is it vulnerable to dictionary and man-in-the-middle attacks and it does 
not support key generation [16].”  The second EAP protocol reviewed in the paper is EAP 
TLS.  While it is not required it does support certificates and provides for mutual 
authentication.  The certificates it authenticates are normally to the device and not the user.  
One of the drawbacks is the infrastructure cost because it requires a certificate server as well 
as the authentication server.  The third method reviewed in the paper is EAP-PEAP.  This 
method has two stages, the first is the establishment of a tunnel between the supplicant and 
the authentication server.  In the second stage, the actual exchange of authentication 
messages takes place.  The paper then reviews the three methods using a criteria of 
authentication time, reauthentication time, packet loss during reauthentication and 
throughput.  While throughput and packet loss shows no difference between the three 
methods, authentication time and reauthentication time did vary.  In both cases MD5 had the 
least amount of time, averaging about 5 times smaller than the other two.  TLS had the 
longest time on authentication. The difference in reauthentication was slight, less than 34ms 
average between the fastest method and the slowest.  While the authors argue that this makes 
EAP-TLS less than satisfactory on a time sensitive network the difference is slight enough 
that a user would not find it significantly noticeable as the longest time delay would be .21 
seconds. 
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 In the second paper, “Research of AAA Messages based on 802.1x Authentication,” 
the team of Jiange Zhang, Yuanbo Guo, Yue Chen, Jun Ma (Zhang, Et al) constructed an 
AAA message for analysis.  They do this using a client (supplicant), switch, and an 
authentication server, in their case using FreeRADIUS version 2.1.10.   And while the rest of 
the paper is mostly a deconstruction of the messages in hexadecimal their conclusion is 
802.1x authentication provides AAA and is effective in controlling user access to a network 
LAN.  Yet it is their recommendation that can be of interest, “One improved method is 
authenticating twice. For example, it adopts identity authentication before network access 
authentication. Consequently, it will enhance the security of network [89].”  I want to call 
attention to their recommendation because they suggest a double authentication, one for the 
identity user and the second for authentication to the network.  This appears to suggest a 
separation of the user identity from the device identity.  This can be critical and represents a 
vector of attack on the EAP, the authentication is completed and a new user without login 
credentials sits at the unattended workstation.  While the paper used EAP MD5 which has no 
certificates, as we see from table 3 there are several other versions and these versions do have 
or require certificates. 
 EAP TLS is a version that uses certificates. Not only does TLS have certificates but it 
is bi-directional verification of identity.  In other words, as a supplicant or peer how do I 
know that the server I am talking to in 802.1x or EAP is actually the server I should be 
talking to?  How do I know the AP is the AP I wanted to talk to and not an evil twin?  Fake 
APs, evil twins, are one of the attack vectors for the adversary.  “Cybercriminals know that 
people regularly use public Wi-Fi and therefore they set up fake access points or compromise 
legitimate WiFi networks to intercept and manipulate their victim’s browsing. Their focus for 
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the attack is user’s passwords, credit cards and other sensitive personal information [100].”   
One of the ways to counter this threat is by having mutual verification.  EAP-TLS offers this 
in that not only the peer (supplicant) but also the server present’s a certificate for verification.  
As you can see from the figure below, the server present’s its certificate while requesting the 
client’s certificate.  This allows the client to verify it is talking to the server it wants to talk 
to.  I wish to examine the exchange a little more in depth as well as EAP-TLS, remembering 
that one of our requirements is a bi-directional verification of identity. 
  
The above figure documents the establishment of an EAP-TLS session as provided in RFC 
5216.  The session actors are the peer, the authenticator, and the EAP server.  The 
authenticator can be an AP, it can be a switch, and thus EAP-TLS works not only on a wired 
network but also on a wireless 802.11 network.  The client can be any device that can use 
802.1x either wired or wireless.  Thus, EAP-TLS is well-suited for the mixed device 
environment of a network.  In EAP-TLS the peer begins the session by attempting to connect 
Figure 8 - TLS Authentication Exchange 
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at which point the AP or switch acting as an authenticator sends out a request, “Who are 
you?”, in effect asking for the client ID, EAP Request ID.  The client says, “Ah ha, EAP” 
and sends an EAP Response with the client ID packet, which the authenticator passes on to 
the EAP server.  From this point on the authenticator will act as a pass through for the 
various messages the client and EAP server generate.  The EAP server send and EAP request 
with EAP-type set to TLS, the Start bit set and no data.  The client says, I see you are not 
only speaking EAP but it is EAP TLS and so it sends an EAP response with EAP-Type set to 
TLS and a TLS client_hello_handshake.  This hello handshake message has the TLS version 
number the client is using, a session ID, a random number, and the set of cipher suites the 
client supports.  Now the EAP server sends an EAP-Request packet.  In this packet the EAP-
Type is set to TLS a server_hello_handshake message, the TLS certificate, the 
server_key_exchange, a certificate request, and then says, server_hello_done.  The server 
hello message contains, the TLS version number, another random number, a session ID, and 
a cipher suite. The cipher suite is from the list the client sent.  The client then says, EAP 
Response with EAP Type is EAP TLS, TLS certificate, certificate verify, a client 
key_exchange, change cipher specification, and a finished.  Now the EAP server will verify 
the client certificate and digital signature then sends a EAP Request, EAP-Type set to EAP 
TLS and the change cipher followed by a TLS finish message.  The client respond’s one last 
time in the handshake with EAP response, EAP-Type set to EAP TLS and the EAP server 
says EAP success.   Of interest is the identity verification and the certificates as these can be 
tools in a mutual identity verification schema. 
 EAP is uniquely suited to provide not only user identity but also device identity.  
There are the two points within the EAP protocol regardless of the methodology you use for 
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identity.  The first is the identity response.  “The Identity Type is used to query the identity of 
the peer [85].”  The second area is for those versions that use certificates.  The certificates 
can contain extensive information but for my purpose it is sufficient to point out this part of 
RFC 3280, “The SubjectAltName MAY carry additional name types through the use of the 
otherName field.  The format and semantics of the name are indicated through the OBJECT 
IDENTIFIER in the type-id field.”  Use of this field is not constrained to a specific type but 
can hold a variety of types, below is a small table listing those types: 
Table 4 - RFC 3280 SubjectAltName Values 
General Name Choice Identifier 
        otherName  [0] OtherName, 
        rfc822Name [1] IA5String, 
        dNSName [2] IA5String, 
        x400Address [3] ORAddress, 
        directoryName [4] Name, 
        ediPartyName [5] EDIPartyName, 
uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String, 
        iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING, 
        registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER 
 
The use of this data type in the peer certificate can point toward a specific resource used to 
validate the identity of the device as well as its registered user. 
 
3.5 Remaining issue 
While authentication is an oft study field and many schemes exist for ensuring mutual 
authentication that mutual authentication is often device to device. In the authentication 
process while the peer consists of two parties the schemes do not make an effort to 
authenticate the user and the device.  For authentication to fulfill its definition completely the 
entity in a computer system, composed of two separate pieces, the user and the device needs 
to be authenticated. Current practices are limited to authenticating the user and assuming the 
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device is a part of the user’s identity.  In some cases, EAP-TLS, IKE the peer device will be 
authenticated using a peer certificate however this then limits the authentication to the device 
possessing a certificate and while the certificate authority (CA) will make every effort to 
ensure the certificate represents an individual, there is no effort to associate the certificate to 
a specific device.  This also occurs in the EAP server.  Certificates are often transferred from 
server to server as hardware is upgraded.  The solution proposed in Chapter 4 will address 
the issue of mutual authentication as well as ensure that the user and the device remain the 
same throughout each session, creating in effect true integrity in each transaction. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PROPOSED SOLUTION 
The attacks on networks and data stores are increasing daily.  In their report, “Internet 
Security Threat 2016”, Symantec stated, the following big numbers: “Over half a billion 
personal records were stolen or lost in 2015.   With an average of 1.1 million web attacks 
blocked per day.”  In addition, they reported that smartphones and mobile devices are 
increasingly becoming the target of attacks.  Just recently, one of the largest distributed 
denial of service attacks was launched against a target, DYN, which acts as a major player in 
the US market as a DNS provider bringing disrupting internet sites such as PayPal, Twitter, 
and Spotify.  “What was most interesting about this attack was that it was largely carried out 
using an Internet of Things (IoT) botnet called Mirai (Linux.Gafgyt) [105].”  The abuse of 
the common resource, the Internet and the hi-jacking of it as a highway for criminal intent 
continues to increase each year.   
One of the very central features, privacy of the user is under attack not just through 
the use of the networks for criminal purposes, but country states on every continent are 
demanding unfettered access to user records.  In China, they have established the Great Wall 
regularly blocking individuals with views the state would prefer to suppress.  In the US, a 
place that generally regards itself as a bastion of right to self-expression and protection of 
individual privacy enshrined in its constitution, Federal, state, and local law enforcement 
agencies demand access providers give them records. The agencies have gone so far to use 
closed courts established by the Patriot Act of 2001 and its extensions to obtain these records.  
The NSA was caught in a recent scandal when a contractor revealed through leaked 
documents the existence of executive authorized federal programs.  Privacy on the internet 
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has been revealed to be a sham for the average user.  Facebook collects meta data and 
Google, one of the largest search engines on the internet if not the largest has been revealed 
to collect meta-data and using it to customize solutions selling that service to vendors and 
others.2  As I previously reported in this paper there are three companies within the US that 
sell the data that not only identify devices but also their users on the internet.  For the legal 
user, there is no privacy on the internet.  As Daniel Newman stated in his article, “There is no 
privacy On the Internet of Things,”  he goes on to explain we, “want to play with the latest 
games, toys and widgets, but we by in large don’t want to trade our cash for them. So instead 
we trade something else; our data and our privacy.”  Even more alarming for those who do 
desire privacy was the results of tests reported in, “FPDetective: dusting the web for 
fingerprinters,” by Gunes Acar, Marc Juarez, Nick Nikiforakis, Claudia Diaz, Seda Gürses, 
Frank Piessens, and Bart Preneel (Acar Et al) “we obtained the same results with respect to 
the number of fonts probed and other browser properties accessed, suggesting that Do Not 
Track (DNT) preferences are ignored by fingerprinters [5].”  In another paper previous cited, 
“Cookieless Monster: Exploring the Ecosystem of Web-Based Device Fingerprinting, 
“Nikiforakis et al found, “Through our analysis, we discovered that, unfortunately, in all 
cases, the extensions were inadequately hiding the real identity of the browser, which could 
still be straightforwardly exposed through JavaScript.”  The team also found there were 
several major issues with the use of these anonymizing extensions.  The old paradigm of an 
“internet for everyone and everyone for the internet,” with a high value placed upon user 
privacy is a fallacy given the above statement of facts.  It is time to make a paradigm shift.  I 
                                                 
2 http://www.pcworld.com/article/2986988/privacy/the-price-of-free-how-apple-facebook-microsoft-and-
google-sell-you-to-advertisers.html is a good explanation of how the process works as well as a window into the 
scope of the information collected. 
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would like to suggest a new paradigm and in the process, show how device fingerprinting, 
can assist in the proper use of identification and authentication. 
4.1 A New paradigm 
In Elinor Ostrom’s book, Governing the Commons, the Nobel Prize winner studies 
the governing of resources held in common.   There is a suggestion of three models of 
governance of commonly held resources.  The first is the case of leviathan, the use of the 
state and its structures to govern the commonly held resource.  The second model is the use 
of privatization.  While the case of the levitation has many proponents, including the current 
US government administration, as seen by this web page [107].  While proclaiming a victory 
for a free and fair Internet, the corollary of this statement is the “FCC just voted in favor of 
strong net neutrality rules” and infers strongly, the government has the power to regulate the 
Internet. There are, as Ostrom states in her book, drawbacks3 to this method.  One of the 
drawbacks is a central agency is divorced from the behavior of the primary users and 
therefore will incorrectly pose sanctions.  A second drawback is no central agency has all the 
information, correctly sourced, understood, and current.  Often government agency 
information is outdated or fails to account correctly for user behavior. 
 The second model is the privatization of the commonly held resource.   Doing so by 
creating a system of private property rights, as has been suggested in EU decisions and 
opinions in regard to Directive 2002/58/EC which states the users are the owners of their data 
on the Internet.  This moves us down the road toward interlocking property rights over data 
on the internet, access to, use of applications, and services obtained through the internet. 
                                                 
3 The discussion of central agency is found on pages 8-11 of the sourced book.  It makes heavy use of game 
theory to project behavior of the governed. 
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 There is a third model in Ostrom’s book and one that should be of interest since in 
truth the internet and networks in general meet a definition of a common resource.  As 
Investopedia is kind enough to point out, “A common resource is a resource, such as water or 
pasture, which provides users with tangible benefits. A major concern with common 
resources is overuse, especially when there are poor social-management systems in place to 
protect the core resource.”4  This model is one in which the users would make a binding 
contract for a cooperative strategy in which the users would determine a strategy for 
providing a penalty to the non-cooperative members.  In this case, the non-cooperative 
members are those who misappropriate the internet resources.   
Regardless of which model is chosen, the days of anonymity across the web are 
coming to an end.  If not through rules and regulation, then through market forces as personal 
data and user behavior have been defined as marketable information.  Therefore, there needs 
to be a paradigm shift.  Instead of a paradigm where users’ privacy is protected we recognize 
what has already happened, user transactional privacy should be protected but efforts to 
protect user identity from discovery, ineffective in the majority of instances should be 
modified to end this effort. 
Instead of if your device has a connector and the user is authorized, track all devices.  
In the early years of the automobile industry anyone with the right equipment and tools could 
and did build automobiles for use and sale.  However, that began to change in 1954 with the 
first use of standardized vehicle identification numbers VIN).  As the industry matured, VINs 
were used for a variety of purposes.  Today at the website for National Highway Traffic and 
                                                 
4 I would argue this definition is especially true of the Internet and networks in general.  However, in place of 
overuse we have misuse.  This misuse would be the use of the network to gain unauthorized economic 
advantage through the blocking of services, the unauthorized access to personal information, and unauthorized 
use of shared resources. 
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Safety Administration you can, using a VIN, determine if the auto is subject to recall, has it 
been reported stolen, check your vehicle’s history including ownership and accident record.  
The automobile is used for a variety of purposes many related to accomplishing life tasks 
using a network of highways.  Computers these days are also used to accomplish many of 
life’s tasks using a network of connecting electronic pipes maintained by a variety of sources, 
ranging from the private to public (non-profit) to government owned networks.  As part of 
the paradigm shift, devices would be identified by a unique ID.  This unique ID would be 
permanently associated with the device.  The unique ID will be used to authenticate and 
reauthenticate the device to the network.  A backend data file of the unique ID will be 
associated with a user/ownership record.  The whole process of identification and 
authentication will change to look more like an EAP authentication with certificates.   
 
There is one new actor in the extended process, this actor is the set of certificate servers 
which act as a farm or storage location.  Let’s take a look at the infra-structure first.  As in 
Peer 
Authenticator EAP 
Server 
Internet 
Certificate 
Farm 
Figure 9 - Modified EAP process 
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EAP you have three sets of actors, the peer, the authenticator, and the EAP server. In EAP, 
802.1x implementation you will have a server which maintains information on the devices 
using which port.  Searching its manually populated database the EAP server will notify the 
authenticator if the device is allowed to connect to the network.  Normally the EAP server 
will store user in a flat data file or it can refer to an external server containing SQL, 
Kerberos, LDAP, or Active Directory for credentials.  In extended EAP, there is an 
additional source of information, the certificate farm (CF).  The contents of the certificate 
farm are similar to what an EAP server contains with a slight modification.  The slight 
modification is shown in the figure below: 
 
The certificate farm has two databases.  The first database is a relational database and 
contains the following files, a user file, a user certificate file, and a user associated device 
file.   The user file will have the user identity and a unique key index.  The user certificate 
User 
credentials 
Device 
credentials 
User Identity 
User certificate 
Validator 
Public key 
Associated Devices 
Device Identity 
Device Type 
Device Certificate 
Validator Fields 
Associated User 
Record 
Record 
Figure 10 - Certificate Farm Data Files 
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file will have the unique key index, related to the unique key index of the user file, the user 
certificate which contains the validator, and the user’s public key.  The last related data file 
will be the associated device file.  The associated device file will have the unique key index 
related to the key index from the user file.  This file will allow multiple devices to be 
associated with a particular user.  The second database in the certificate farm is also a 
relational database composed of the following data files; device identity, device certificate, 
device validators, and associated users.  The device identity file will contain fields for device 
identity, device type, device unique descriptor, and a unique device id index field.  The 
device certificate file will contain the device id index field, the device certificate.  The third 
file will contain the unique device id field related to the device identity file and a set of 
validator fields.  The last file in the relational data base is a record of devices from the first 
file and contains a list of associated users with the device id from the first file.  This unique 
id is not unique in this file.  
 In order to understand how this works, I want to use the following use cases; the first 
is the user with a device will authenticate through EAP.  The second use case will be a device 
will authenticate. The second use case describes how the internet of things (IoT) as well as 
devices not traditionally recognized in a network access control (NAC) process will 
authenticate and of course re-authenticate as needed. 
 The first use case, designated 1.0, has multiple sub-cases.  In the first sub-case, 
designated 1.1, the user is a member of an organization.  In the second sub-case, designated 
1.2, the user is a person wishing to use a public AP.  In the third sub-case, designated 1.3, a 
person wishes to use a public network.  In use case 1.1, a user approaches the network and 
wants to connect.  In today’s workplace, the device might be an already constrained device 
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such as a company owned laptop/workstation/mobile device or it might be a bring your own 
device (BYOD) smartphone, laptop, or tablet.  Regardless of the device and the user the 
following are already pre-existing, the user has a certificate and so does the device.  For use 
case 1.1 the existence of the user certificate is because the company has granted him a 
certificate to use while logging into the network.  These credentials are stored in the EAP 
server and also stored in the certificate farm.  In the case of the device the device certificate 
may reside on the EAP server but it definitely is available in the certificate farm, in the 
device database.  The validators for the device in the device database are those items that are 
used to construct the device’s fingerprint.  These validators are items that based upon the 
device are passively observable.  For the laptop/workstation it will consist of the clock skew 
of the processor measured against the CF’s device server.  Additional validator fields will 
include the MAC address, the OS, and the browser unique identifiers.  For a smartphone/data 
phone/tablets the validator fields will be the accelerator skew, the clock skew, and the MAC 
identifier.  For a sensor, the validator fields will consist of clock skew, MAC, and location. 
 The peer connects or powers on the device.  The first EAP Request flows from the 
authenticator, EAP request for client ID.  The first of two messages flow back, EAP response 
with peer user ID, Pu.  The second response message is peer device ID, Pd.  The authenticator 
passes the messages to the EAP server.  The EAP server reviews its user and device records 
looking for a match, M, 𝑀𝑀 =  𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢 + 𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑.  If the EAP server has a match, there is no need to 
send a request to the CF.  If there is no match either for Pu or for Pd or for both the EAP 
server queries the CF for matches.  The CF will search for either both values or for only the 
value the EAP server sends to it.  If it recovers a match, the information is provided to the 
EAP server.  Now the EAP server will add the records to its file and the EAP process 
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continues with the EAP Request EAP TLS start bit set.  The EAP response client Hello 
handshake continues as before.  The next change comes in the step where the EAP server 
requests the certificate.  In this step both Pu and Pd will provide their certificates for 
validation.  The server will validate both certificates and on success send EAP request EAP 
type = EAP-TLS change cipher spec and TLS finished.  Pu and Pd respond with EAP 
response followed by the EAP server’s EAP success message.  In this manner both Pu and Pd 
are identified and authenticated to the network, A or 𝐴𝐴 = (𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢)(𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢) where Pui is Peer 
user identity, Puc is the Peer user certificate and Pdi is Peer device identity, and Pdc is the Peer 
device certificate.  What happens if there is no match at the EAP server or the CF?  
Remember in this use case both Pu and Pd and must be authenticated.  It is not sufficient for 
one to be validated without the other being validated.  Thus, if either of the two elements are 
invalid then the EAP server refuses connection. 
In use case 1.2, the user is a person wishing to use a public AP, whether this AP is in 
a hotel wired or a wireless AP there is an assumption the EAP server does not exist.  As such 
the credentials or certificates do not exist on the AP.  Therefore, all the transactions will 
occur with the CF.  The peer connects or powers on the device.  The first EAP Request flows 
from the authenticator, EAP request for client ID.  The first of two messages flow back, EAP 
response with peer user ID, Pu.  The second response message is peer device ID, Pd.  The 
authenticator passes the messages to the CF.  The CF reviews its user and databases looking 
for a match, M, 𝑀𝑀 =  𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢 + 𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑 .  If it recovers a match, the information is provided to the EAP 
authenticator sending the EAP Request EAP TLS start bit set.  The EAP response client 
Hello handshake continues as before.  In the place where the EAP server would send its 
certificate the CF having the certificate for the AP provides that to the peer.  The next change 
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comes in the step where the EAP server requests the certificate.  In this step both Pu and Pd 
will provide their certificates for validation.  The CF will validate both certificates and on 
success send EAP request EAP type = EAP-TLS change cipher spec and TLS finished.  Pu 
and Pd respond with EAP response followed by the EAP server’s EAP success message.  In 
this manner both Pu and Pd are identified and authenticated to the network, A  or 𝐴𝐴 =(𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢)(𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢) where Pui is Peer user identity, Puc is the Peer user certificate and Pdi is Peer 
device identity, and Pdc is the Peer device certificate.  What happens if there is no match in 
the CF?  Remember in this use case both Pu and Pd and must be authenticated.  It is not 
sufficient for one to be validated without the other being validated.  Thus, if either of the two 
elements are invalid then the CF tells the authenticator to refuse the connection. 
The last use case is the peer wishes to use a public network.  This would be a network 
that is provided not just as an access point but also has resources attached to it, normally this 
type of network is associated with a library or similar community service and has a firewall 
isolating its public portion from the business services of the community service.  In this use 
case the process is exactly the same as in use case 1.1.  The difference would be the timed 
storage of credentials would periodically expire so a heavier use of the CF will occur. 
Moving to use case 2 which is where the peer is a device only.  You normally find 
this type of use case where supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system or 
sensor resides on the network.  In the internet of things (IoT) such devices range from the 
SCADA mentioned above to the refrigerator sensing what you use and sending an order to 
the grocery store or even the control system for your DVD-R or heating or lights, or simply a 
web camera sending images to a backend storage device as part of a building security system.  
Sense one of our goals is to not have any unknown devices attached to the network our EAP-
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TLS process has to account for these devices.  The major problem here is EAP-TLS is a 
request response system.  Some of the devices contain a processor who’s only set of 
instructions are to check a sensor and send the results to a monitoring station.  The recent 
DDoS attack on DYN proved that these devices must be accounted for in any network 
security plan.  If you remember the certificate for each device is stored in the CF and 
associated with a record for the device with specific identifiers, validators.  These validators 
are items that can be passively observed in the network traffic of a device.  We now have a 
process to cover this type of devices connecting to the network with periodic reauthentication 
that looks similar to the process described below: 
 Step one the device attempts to connect, and the authenticator sends the EAP Request 
ID.  Normally the peer sends back its user ID but in this case, the EAP response will send a 
user ID message with additional information.  This additional information is, device type, 
current time, MAC, location, and associated user set to the business/personal entity 
deploying the device.   The EAP server will follow the protocol in search its records and if 
found will open the port, if not found it will query the CF.  If the CF finds a match in its 
device database, then it will send the records to the EAP server for inclusion in its validation 
data file.  The EAP server will then open the port.  If there is no match in the EAP server or 
in the CF, then the port will remain closed. 
 As you can see this is a paradigm shift requiring every device on the network is 
accounted for and assigned to an owner.  This also does away with user anonymity and 
assigns a particular device or set of devices to each user.  This process also extends the reach 
of the certificate servers because sites or servers or user will not be the only items with a 
certificate but each user and device will have a certificate.   There are other consequences of 
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making this shift but are beyond the scope of this current paper other than to note that this 
scheme does not fall afoul of the EU privacy rule due to the exceptions included in the 
opinion, “As described in Opinion 04/2012, Article 5(3) allows for processing to be exempt 
from the requirement of consent, if one of the following criteria is satisfied: 
CRITERION A: technical storage or access ‘for the sole purpose of carrying out the 
transmission of a communication over an electronic communications network’. 
CRITERION B: technical storage or access which is ‘strictly necessary in order for the 
provider of an information society service explicitly requested by the subscriber or user to 
provide the service’ [93].”  This process changes the way in which access is provided to the 
user or subscriber and the information gathered would be necessary to provide service to the 
user thus meeting criterion B of the opinion. 
 
4.2 Creating the device fingerprint for the certificate farm 
 There are three different stages in the creation and use of the device fingerprinting in 
authentication.  These stages are generically speaking: pattern or profile generation, 
enrollment, and validation.  During pattern generation the pattern used for the fingerprint is 
created and assigned to a profile.  This profile is stored and assigned an arbitrary identifier.  
The focus during this stage is to clearly define a pattern that can be reviewed and tested 
against.  In stage two of the process, the enrollment stage, the pattern has been confirmed as 
existing and distinct enough to use in measurement.  It is transferred to the enrollment 
container for use against a trace.  During the enrollment stage the pattern is validated as 
unique and not pre-existing by reviewing previously existing profiles.  If there is no pre-
existing profile with the same pattern then the profile is transferred to the validation stage.  
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At this point the profile is viewed against a trace of the data set including the device.  If the 
accuracy of identity meets the pre-determined threshold, the profile is transferred to the 
certification farm for pre-staging.  Pre-staging is the device has not been seen on the network.  
Once the device is seen on the network, the balance of the record is complete and the record 
if is stored with a certificate containing all the required information for use in subsequent 
identification and authentication efforts.  It is this three phased process that can be 
accomplished in a pre-sale environment by the manufacturer.  
The device fingerprints once created are registered to the Certificate Farm.  Similarly, 
to the automobile industry, this can be done from the manufacturer’s facility.  The initial 
record for each device manufactured for sale would be forwarded to the Certificate Farm 
(CF) or available from the manufacturer’s site to be downloaded by the CF as needed.  Upon 
first use the CF would begin by populating the rest of the record in their data file and the 
certificate would be complete and available for authentication.  By having the manufacturer 
capture the data you will have a controlled environment which will assist capturing critical 
data.  And in the case of the smartphone/data phone/tablets will easily capture the accelerator 
data critical to the creation of the device digital fingerprint.  It will also ensure the MAC 
address is not spoofed in the device fingerprint.  Finally, as all of the information in the 
device fingerprints are captured through passive observation it would eliminate this stage of 
the process. 
There are so many ways to identify devices, to create device fingerprints.  In chapter 
two we lightly surveyed four major ways devices are fingerprinted today, hardware including 
clock skew, software, user behavior, and the browser.  In researching for this paper there was 
one team that suggested the unique device fingerprint be associated with a charging cable 
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[15].  The object is to strengthen security in a poly device network which includes not only 
the user/laptop hybrids of traditional networks but also sensors, SCADA, smart devices, and 
various appliances.  This objective is executed in the proposed solution because in the 
network every device is identified through the authentication process.  This is accomplished 
by uniquely crafting an identity for a device based upon several characteristics which can be 
used to validate their identity through passive observation and without requiring input.  
In constructing the device fingerprint for the laptop/workstation the clock skew Cd 
measured against the clock of the CF device storage Fv, the OS or Od , the MAC (which can 
be spoofed) or Ad and the browser identifiers (B1, B2, B3, and B4)  are used to construct the 
device fingerprint.  The browser identifiers are contained in the table below: 
Table 5 - Browser Features in Fingerprint 
Feature Vector measured Identifier 
Browser type(s) HTTP B1 
Time of day HTTP B2 
Country HTTP B3 
Fonts Script B4 
 
The laptop/workstation device fingerprint is stated thus: 
𝐹𝐹 = (�𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑′ (𝑡𝑡) −  𝐹𝐹𝑣𝑣′(𝑡𝑡)� + 𝑂𝑂𝑑𝑑 + 𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑 + 𝐵𝐵1 + 𝐵𝐵2 + 𝐵𝐵3 + 𝐵𝐵4). 
The fingerprint for a smartphone/data phone/tablet would be constructed using the 
accelerator skew from true 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖, the clock skew using the CF server as the device receiving, 
and the MAC resulting in fingerprint looking something like this: 
𝐹𝐹 = (�𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑′ (𝑡𝑡) − 𝐹𝐹𝑣𝑣′(𝑡𝑡)� + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  + 𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑). 
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The simple sensor set for SCADA or for IP security cameras with clock skew, location Wd 
will yield a fingerprint looking like this: 𝐹𝐹 = (�𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑′ (𝑡𝑡) − 𝐹𝐹𝑣𝑣′(𝑡𝑡)� + 𝑊𝑊𝑑𝑑  + 𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑).  By adding 
together various vectors to constitute the fingerprint the opportunity for uniqueness increases. 
 In this section we have looked at the process used to create a device fingerprint and 
based upon the research surveyed in chapter two of this paper suggested a composite device 
fingerprint that makes use of the clock skew in all three sets of devices. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY 
 
This paper explored the proposition, device finger printing can be used as part of a 
multi-factor identification/authentication scheme that adds security to a network.  It advanced 
the concept of not only identifying the user for access to the network but, the device and user 
form a combination that should be identified prior to network authorization. Its goal was 
accomplished by looking at relevant research and where possible the data sets that supported 
that research.  The terms of identification and authentication were explored to ensure the 
issue was understood and the current definition was refined to add the concept of both 
entities presenting an identity for authentication.  The paper presented a concept to included 
methods for handling those devices sensors, printers, etc. that do not participate in a bi-
directional handshake.  A process was offered for providing access to the networks using the 
EAP-TLS framework as a touchline. Finally, sample of how the device fingerprint for the 
various categories that make up the device population in a poly device network was proposed 
as well as how to populate the certificate farm. 
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APPENDIX 
LINKS TO DATA SETS 
 
The links below are online copies of the data sets used in the research found in Chapter Two 
of this paper.  Every effort was made to associate the data sets with the various papers.  In 
some cases, the data set was used by two or more sets of research teams. 
 
 
CRAWDAD (Community Resource for Archiving Wireless Data at Dartmouth) – has a 
collection of data sets and tools.  I am providing the datasets that are relevant. 
 
http://crawdad.org/init/factory/20160613/  no paper but interesting dataset on 802.11 signals 
in a noisy environment. 
 
http://crawdad.org/gatech/fingerprinting/20140609/ - [81] and [82] 
http://crawdad.org/sapienza/probe-requests/20130910/  - no paper associated but a set of 
probe response request frames. 
 
http://crawdad.org/uw/sigcomm2004/20061017/  - [19], [46], [53], and [66] 
https://webtransparency.cs.princeton.edu/webcensus/ - this site has multiple data sets that can 
be used in a variety of research papers primary emphasis is on websites and tracking across 
the internet. 
 
https://fingerbank.inverse.ca/api/v1/download?key=dfe76f39e03ac8987e0898c038596e3fb41
7cda8 – no paper 
 
 
 
 
 
 
